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Abstract 
Thaksin Shinawatra is a successful Thai business tycoon who 
has become extremely wealthy within the last fifteen years from 
investment in telecommunications and lately also in mass-tran- 
sit infrastructure. He entered politics in the mid-1990s and be- 
came a party leader and minister in several governments. 
Through a study of Thaksin's business career and his political 
involvement I intend to illustrate how Thai politics functions in 
practice, as well as to highlight the intimate links between 
money and politics in Thailand, particularly in the telecommu- 
nications sector. During the economic boom the telecommuni- 
cations sector was characterised by substantial profits and stiff 
competition, but after the economic crisis in July 1997 the Thai 
telecoms firms sustained heavy losses. In a surprise move the 
two biggest telecommunications conglomerates-Shinawatra 
and Charoen Phokapand-announced that they would merge 
some of their telecommunications firms, thereby creating one of 
the biggest concentrations of assets in Thailand and at the same 
time a de fact0 monopolisation of tlie telecommunications 
market. As if that were not enough, Shinawatra, together with 
his former arch-rival, has launched a new political party-Thai 
Rak Thai [Thai loves Thai]. This move may have profound 
implications for the development of Thai politics.' 
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Introduction: Post-war development of Thai capital 
groups 
Before studying Thaksin Shinawatra, his business empire and 
political involvement in detail, I shall give an overview of the 
development of business and capital groups in Thailand. For 
this purpose I shall rely on two texts written by Akira Suehiro 
(1989, 1992) where he characterises and describes the develop- 
ment of Thai capital groups from World War I1 to the 1980s. 
Akira divides Thai capital in this period into three groups: 
banking capital, industrial capital and the agri-industry capital. 
Banking capital. The withdrawal of foreign banks, high infla- 
tion, and the end of Japanese influence in Thailand at the end of 
World War I1 provided an opportunity for the appearance of 
five new overseas Chinese banks.2 According to Suehiro, the 
critical element in the success of these banks was their special 
relationship with powerful bureaucratic and military factions. 
Industrial capital. Suehiro's study of twenty-two industrial 
groups during the 1960s and 1970s shows that the privileges 
extended to them by the Board of Investment of Thailand 
facilitated a high level of protection, and eventually trans- 
formed them from importers of products such as automobiles, 
petroleum, steel and garments to manufacturers of the same 
products. 
Agri - indus try  capital. According to Suehiro the purchase of 
foreign technology was significant for the growth of agri- 
industry groups throughout the period 1970-80, exemplified by 
the giant company Charoen Phokapand (CP), which purchased 
tiger-shrimp feeding technology from the Japanese Mitsubishi 
Corporation and crop development technology from American 
Dekalp Agroresearch. 
There were other conditions which were relevant for the 
emergence and development of Thai capital: 
The investment promotion and import substitution policy, 
incorporated in Thailand's first three national economic plans, 
were protectionist measures that assisted local Thai industry in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Hewison 1989: 37). 
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A business promotion credit system in the 1960s also aided 
the development of Thai capital groups. The Industrial Finance 
Corporation of Thailand (IFCT)? which worked closely with the 
Board of Investment and the Industrial Promotion Department, 
was a major public soft-loan lender to many private companies. 
The majority of credit borrowers in much of the private sector 
took low-interest loans and purchased foreign currency from 
the IFCT rather than from foreign banks.4 
Government policy towards labour organisations was 
favourable to local and foreign entrepreneurs, which resulted in 
weak labour unions and low wages. (Chamlong 1964: 44-45). 
This categorisation and characterisation of capital groups and 
the conditions that favoured capital growth in Thailand provide 
a clear picture of the path of development followed by banking, 
industrial, and agri-industrial capital groups in the 1950-80 
period. However, in the 1990s this analysis of the Thai capital 
system became inadequate because several new factors opened 
up new opportunities for investment. 
First, from the 1980s, a series of technological innovations in 
the micro-electronics field created a large number of new com- 
puter, telephone, and television products. The international 
developers of these technologies were generally prepared to sell 
these new advances on the open market. Also, from the 1980s, 
the Thai government opened up telecommunications projects to 
privatisation (Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 1995; Pasuk and Baker 1995: 
164). Consequently capital groups, such as the Vilailuck family, 
Samart group, UCOM group, Jusmin International, Telecom 
Asia (CP group) as well as the Shinawatra group seized this 
opportunity and became prominent telecommunications 
groups both in Thailand and the region, expanding their busi- 
ness linkages to Indochina, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, 
India and China (Pasuk and Baker 1995: 165). These groups, 
then, provide a useful focus for the purposes of this study. An- 
other factor is the involvement of the main capital groups in the 
many large-scale, mass-transit projects designed to alleviate the 
acute traffic problem in Bangkok. 
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Both the telecommunications and mass-transit projects are in 
the hands of public authorities and are ultimately administered 
by various ministries. Political connections have become of 
paramount importance to secure access to these projects, and 
thus a political involvement has become a sine qua non for the 
competing capital groups. This can be exemplified by the tele- 
communications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, who entered poli- 
tics in the mid-1990s, becoming a party leader and minister in 
several governments. Lately, he has even established his own 
political party together with his previous competitor. Thus 
Thaksin Shinawatra well illustrates the interrelationship be- 
tween the telecommunications business, mass-transit projects 
and politics in Thailand. 
The above factors have since the mid-1980s been facilitated 
by the booming economy, as well as by state privatisation and 
liberalisation policies. 
1987-96: A booming stock market and privatisation 
The year 1987 was an important period of transition for the 
Thai economy. In spite of the fact that Thailand in 1984-86 had 
experienced economic stagnation, the conservative financial 
policy of the Thai government brought major monetary savings 
and effected a reduction in foreign debt. Thus the government 
budget eventually balanced in 1987-88. Because of the balanced 
budget, new opportunities emerged. The higher valued Japa- 
nese yen, Korean von and Taiwanese dollars stimulated the 
flow of industrial factories from these countries to the lower 
production-cost countries in Southeast Asia. From 1987-90 
Thailand became a favourite country for industrialised nations 
that wished to relocate their factories. The aforementioned 
factors resulted in a ten to twenty-fold increase in the asset 
value of both real estate and corporate shares. Due to the influx 
of money, the economy continued to grow and many Thais be- 
came wealthy. Simultaneously, a political strengthening by the 
Ukrist Pathmanand 
new Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, further boosted 
incremental asset value through open economic competition. 
This significant economic change stimulated demand and en- 
couraged bureaucratic initiatives towards adjusting long-term 
policies, such as: 
To develop the SET (Stock Exchange of Thailand), which 
had a duty to secure the continuation of economic growth in 
order to enhance the domestic capital market. 
To privatise state enterprises, although this proved a more 
problematic task: some people maintained that state enterprises 
were too inefficient to serve the economic growth of the coun- 
try, while others thought them too important to release from 
state control. 
The revitalisation of the SET and the privatisation policy be- 
came new foci of monetary power. Money is an inevitable key 
to political success, and political success in its turn stimulates 
business opportunities and more money. 
Liberalisation of telecommunications 
The emergence of non-state telecommunications business in 
Thailand became a reality because of the gradual deregulation 
of the telecommunications sector since 1988, which up to then 
had been monopolised by state agencies, such as the Telephone 
Organization of Thailand (TOT) and the Communications 
Authority of Thailand (CAT). 
According to Sakkarin's study, the telecommunications 
regulatory reform since the mid-1980s has passed through two 
phases, each with a rather distinctive trajectory. 
First phase of telecommunications regulatory reform 
The first phase, which covered the last years of the sixth Prem 
government (1986-88) and the Chatichai government (1988-91), 
was characterised by the continuation of a state monopoly in all 
areas of the telecommunications industry, slightly modified by 
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the introduction of deregulation and some private participation 
in several sectors (Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 1995: 75). 
Under Prem Tinsulanonda's government, the telecommuni- 
cations deregulation was quite limited. Sakkarin points out that 
if Prem's rule represented a transition from an authoritarian 
towards a more democratic regime, during which the military 
and other bureaucratic agencies struggled to retain their power 
bases against challenges posed by political parties and business, 
the regulatory reforms in the telecommunications sector also 
revealed conflicts involving the aforementioned interests 
(Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 1995: 78). 
The political instability5 and the politics of privatisation of 
major state enterprises (particularly the TOT, the Port Authority 
of Thailand and the State Railway of Thailand) obstructed tele- 
communications reforms during the Prem government 
(Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 1995: 78, 84), but these reforms were 
more successful under the more democratic and party-based 
system of the Chatichai regime, when more than twenty tele- 
communications concessions were granted to private investors 
(Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 1995: 103) 
Second phase of telecommunications regulatory reform 
The second phase may be dated from the overthrow of the 
Chatichai government in February 1991 followed by the first 
Anand government (February 1991 to March 1992), the short- 
lived regime under General Suchinda in April-May 1992, a 
second Anand caretaker government, and then to the Chuan 
government which followed the September 1992 election. 
During this period much more rapid progress was made 
towards bringing down the state monopoly both by modifi- 
cation of laws governing telecommunications and through joint 
ventures between the state and business (Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 
1995: 75). 
From the outset of the 1990s, the telecommunications indus- 
try in Thailand changed dramatically. Many more types of 
technology became available, ranging from basic telephone 
lines to cellular phones, pagers, and fibre-optic systems and 
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satellites. Furthermore, additional concessionaire state agencies 
appeared, such as the Post & Telegraph Department and the 
Ministry of Communications and Telecommunications. And 
finally, the software sector expanded dramatically along with 
the number of cellular phones (Suehiro 1995: 25-26), 
The deregulation was largely the result of international pres- 
sure for the liberalisation of telecommunications from countries 
where the major telecoms companies were based, such as the 
US, Canada, Japan and various EU nations. This drive towards 
deregulation gathered momentum at various international 
meetings from the 1980s onwards, and culminated in the Tele- 
communications Technology Agreement of 1996. The most 
serious repercussion of this Agreement for the telecommuni- 
cations industry in Thailand was that it damaged the joint 
venture systems and the concessions that had already been 
granted to Thai telecommunications tycoons under the de- 
regulation policy since 1988. 
As a result of this deregulation the Thai telecommunications 
market has since the beginning of the 1990s become very com- 
petitive. There are now two land-line telephone operators using 
two different systems of transmission (analogue and digital), 
four mobile phone operators as well as six pager-operating 
companies (Siam Commercial 1997). 
In order to understand how the liberalisation functioned in 
practice, both in the telecommunications and mass communi- 
cations sectors, and what the economic and political conse- 
quences have been, it may be useful to make a closer study of 
one of the central actors in this field: Thaksin Shinawatra. His 
telecommunications group started as a small mini- and main- 
frame computer-leasing company with just ten employees in 
1980 and then grew to the 100 billion baht telecommunications 
empire it is today (Phairo 1995: 72). 
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Thaksin Shinawatra and the development of his 
business empire 
Thaksin Shinawatra is the fourth generation of an overseas 
Chinese merchant family founded by Ku Sun Saeng, who 
moved from Chantaburi in eastern Thailand to Chiangmai in 
northern Thailand in 1908. Ku Sun Saeng became a tax collector 
in Mae Rim, San Sai and Doi Saket districts of Chiangmai pro- 
vince (Plai-Or 1987: 53), and simultanously started up as a silk 
trader in Chiangmai using the Chiangmai-Burma trade route. 
His successors in the second and the third generation ex- 
tended the business by building a silk factory in Chiangmai in 
1932 (Plai-Or 1987: 53-54) and by diversifying their business 
activities. They became representatives of commercial banks 
(Siam City Bank), school owners, bus operators, land traders, as 
well as department store and cinema owners in Chiangmai 
(Plai-Or 1987: 104-105). 
Thaksin's father, Boonlert, entered local politics in Chiang- 
mai, while his uncle, Suraphan, entered the national political 
arena. Suraphan was for a long period the Chiangmai repre- 
sentative for the Chart Thai Party as well as for a time the 
Deputy Minister of Communications (Sorakol1996: 20-21). 
Thaksin's career differs in many respects from that of his 
forebears, who were firmly rooted in northern Thai society and 
politics. Thaksin was born in 1949 and graduated from the 
Royal Thai Police Academy as the top student in 1973. He then 
received a Thai government scholarship to study criminal 
justice at Eastern Kentucky University, whence he graduated in 
1976 cum laude. In 1979 he gained a PhD in criminal justice at 
Sam Houston State University, Texas (Sorakol1996: 32-33). 
On his return to Thailand he started his first computer trad- 
ing company (1980) and married Potjaman Damapong, 
daughter of the powerful Deputy Police Chief General Samoer 
Damapong. Thaksin was the head of the Police Department's 
Research and Planning Division in 1979, when it was decided to 
install computers throughout the entire Police Department 
(Sorakol 1996: 30). By making use of General Samoerfs connec- 
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tions, Thaksin became the computer supplier for the whole 
Police Department as well as other administrative offices at the 
beginning of the 1980s. 
In the period 1990-94 Shinawatra listed four of his companies 
on the stock exchange: Shinawatra Computer and Communi- 
cations (listed 1990), Advanced Info Service (listed 1991), Inter- 
national Broadcasting Corporation (listed 1992), and Shina- 
watra Satellite (listed 1994). This generated an enormous profit, 
both on sales, net profits and assets (The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand 1995). Thus Thaksin chose capital mobilisation in the 
stock exchange as a strategy to expand, and this capital mobili- 
sation was used to develop new projects. To give an example, 
Advanced Info Service funds provided 300 million baht for a 
new cellular telephone operation licence, the establishment of 
an information network service under a new company named 
Shinawatra Datacom, as well as the opening of Shinawatra 
Paging Company for the operation of a new pager service 
(Darunee 1993: 62). Shinawatra Computer and Communica- 
tions mobilised another huge sum by purchasing 2.1 million of 
its own shares, thus making a profit of some 525 million baht. 
In the same year, this company increased its registered capital 
from 400 million baht to 1,000 million baht and used these 
funds to establish yet another company named Shinawatra 
Directory to sub-license the telephone directory from AT&T 
Directory, as well as to operate another mega-project: Shina- 
watra Satellite, the first satellite in Thailand (Darunee 1993: 63). 
Capital mobilisation within the stock exchange was thus a 
major method for both increasing his companies' assets and for 
diversifying the companies' telecommunications industry 
network, 
When the government, in line with its privatisation policy, 
started to list public enterprises on the stock market, Thaksin 
bought a considerable amount of the shares available to the 
public. He thus became a major shareholder in Thai Airways 
International and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, as well 
as in the big infrastructure company Bangkok Expressway Con- 
sortium Limited (BECL). 
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But Thaksin met with stiff competition from other large capital 
groups and it is no secret that Shinawatra's strongest compe- 
titors in the telecommunications industry enjoyed close connec- 
tions with many important political players in Thailand. For 
example, the Charoen Phokapand (CP) conglomerate had close 
ties to the New Aspiration Party (NAP), the Prachakorn Thai 
Party and the Chart Pattana Party as well as to many influential 
bureaucrats and military personnel. Meanwhile the Jusmin 
International group had close connections with the Chart Thai 
Party and the Chart Pattana Party, whereas the UCOM group 
had links to the Democrat Party. Where did this leave the 
Shinawatra group? It had contacts within the bureaucracy, but 
no alliance with any political party. This was to prove fatal dur- 
ing the first major conflict in the telecommunications industry 
in 1990, when the granting of the lucrative three million 
telephone line concessions (worth 120 billion baht with twenty- 
five years of protection) went to Thaksin's strongest competitor, 
Telecom Asia (TA) of the CP group (Phairo 1995: 85). The 
Shinawatra group thus missed a historic concession because it 
lacked the right political affiliations. Since 1990 Thaksin has in- 
stead expanded into other areas of the telecommunications 
industry, investing in mobile phones, pagers, pay-TVs and 
satellites, but he also realised that he had to find a new political 
strategy. And the strategy he chose was to enter the political 
arena in person rather than by proxy, in order to secure direct 
control over relevant public resources. 
Thaksin enters the political arena 
Thaksin first joined the Chuan Leekpai (Democrat) government 
in 1994 as Minister of Foreign Affairs, then he became head of 
the Palang Dharma Party (PDP), which was a coalition partner 
in the Chuan and Banharn governments. At this point Thaksin 
left politics for a while, but is now back in the fray having esta- 
blished his own political party Thai Rak Thai [TRK: 'Thais love 
Thais'). 
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On 14 November 1985 Major General Chamlong Srimuang won 
a landslide victory in the election for Bangkok Governor, with a 
popular image as 'Mr Clean'. Building on this success 
Chamlong, together with some members of the Santi Asoke 
Buddhist sect, founded the Palang Dharma Party (PDP) on the 
same 'clean politics' and 'anti-corruption' political platform. 
While Palang Dharma enjoyed a strong political base in Bang- 
kok, it failed to make inroads in the provinces (McCargo 1997: 
125). For a number of reasons the popularity of the PDP even- 
tually declined and Chamlong decided to step down as PDP 
leader in May 1992. He handed over the leadership to two PDP 
politicians, but then in late 1994 he resumed the leadership once 
more, only to hand over the reins to Thaksin in mid-1995. 
By the end of 1994, Thaksin had joined the Chuan Leekpai 
government as Minister of Foreign Affairs, albeit only for a 
brief period. In spite of his short time as Minister, he managed 
to secure the appointment of his close friend Vichit Suraphong- 
chai (ex-MD of Bangkok Bank) to the post of Minister of Com- 
munications. In this way he hoped to secure protection for his 
telecommunications empire. But when Thaksin and his allies 
also attempted to control a new 1.1 million telephone line con- 
cession, his competitors declared war (Manager Daily, 25 
November 1995). 
Initially startled by the turn of events, Thaksin's competitors 
realised his intention was to exploit his political position to 
further his business interests. Therefore, when the Chuan 
government was replaced with the Banharn Silpa-archa 
government in July 1995, the CP group used their political 
proxy-the NAP-to wrest the key post of Minister of Communi- 
cations out of the grasp of Thaksin and PDP members and 
instead transfer it to an ally of the CP. 
The coalition government of Banharn consisted of three main 
parties: the Chart Thai Party, the NAP and the PDP. Thaksin 
and his followers lost control of the Ministry of Communi- 
cations to NAP members, who monopolised the telecommuni- 
cations sector during the Banharn administration. Thus in July 
1995 the Minister of Communications Wan Muhamad Nor 
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Mata and Deputy Minister Sombat Uthaisank, both from the 
NAP, assumed control over the gigantic state enterprises: the 
Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) and the Communi- 
cations Authority of Thailand (CAT). Furthermore, in August 
1995, persons close to the NAP were appointed to important 
committees. For example, General Sirin Thoupkram, a former 
subordinate of NAP leader General Chavalit, was installed as 
the new President of TOT, while Phaisan Peauphol, a legal con- 
sultant of the NAP, was appointed to the TOT board committee 
(Bangkok Post Sunday Perspective, 27 August 1995). In January 
1996 NAP members replaced old committee members in the 
Communication Ministry's profitable enterprise, the Nong Ngu 
Hao, which will make decisions on the building of a new inter- 
national airport to replace Don Muang in Bangkok. 
One of the results of these changes was that the Advanced 
Info Service's (Shinawatra group) monopoly on cellular tele- 
phones was replaced with another mobile phone system, the 
Personal Handy System, which belongs to Telecom Asia of the 
CP group, Shinawatra's biggest competitor! Furthermore, 
shortly after his arrival in the government, the head of NAP, 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, as Minister of Defence, pushed 
through a project to launch a military satellite to be named the 
Star of Siam. This threatened Shinawatra's monopoly on com- 
munications satellites, although this project was later shelved 
(The Nation, 28 December 1995: Al).7 Thaksin and his followers 
responded to these developments by adopting a new strategy: 
they attempted to control the Bangkok Mass Transit System 
instead. 
Bangkok Mass Transit System: 
New business opportunities 
Traffic is a perennial subject of discussion among Bangkokians, 
and they eagerly look for someone who has the overview and 
the power to tackle the enormous traffic problems of Bangkok 
in an integrated and co-ordinated manner. Whatever solution is 
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chosen, it necessarily entails huge investments, which also 
implies potentially huge profits for the firms that secure the 
contracts for these projects, namely the construction firms, 
private investment firms, land speculators, etc. From July 1995 
to February 1996, Thaksin as Deputy Prime Minister and head 
of the Bangkok Traffic Solving Team, assumed total responsi- 
bility for the Bangkok Mass Transit System (BMTS). He and his 
PDP team did two things. 
First, he rearranged the subcontracted projects which were 
controlled by the Tanayong group, a giant overseas Chinese 
land development company that invested both in Hong Kong 
and Thailand. This group had won the concession to build and 
operate the first Bangkok Sky Train, projected to cost 28 billion 
baht (Bangkok Mass Transit 1993). Thaksin used his political 
clout in Bangkok to request that Siam Commercial Bank and 
other banks be permitted to increase their shares in BMTS pro- 
jects, thus minimising the business status of the Tanayong 
group. Managing Director of the Siam Commercial Bank, Olarn 
Chaiprawat, Managing Director of the Siam City Bank, Som 
Jatusriphitak, and Managing Director of the Thai Military Bank, 
Thanong Phitaya, had all supported Thaksin during various 
election campaigns.' It is, furthermore, no coincidence that 
Somkit Jatusriphitak, a younger brother of Som Jatusriphitak, 
served as Thaksin's Secretary for each of Thaksin's tenures as 
minister. 
Second, Thaksin and PDP's Minister, being in charge of the 
Expressway Authority of Thailand (EAT), were given full 
authority over three new huge infrastructure projects-the Dao- 
kanong-Bangkunthien-Samutsakorn Rapid Transit Project (18 
billion baht), the Chaeng Wattana-Bangpoon-Bangsai Rapid 
Transit Project (23 billion baht) and a feasibility study on a 
mono-rail system in Bangkok. This happened in spite of the fact 
that Thaltsin and his family held shares in the infrastructure 
construction company Bangkok Expressway Consortium 
Limited (BECL), which had obtained special rights for the 
Second Stage Expressway concession bidding. 
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On 9 September 1995, the Banharn government approved a 
motion relegating the responsibility for the EAT, a Ministry of 
Interior enterprise which operated the Chaeng Wattana-Bang- 
poon-Bangsai Rapid Transit Project, to the PDP. A decision on 
Bangkok Expressway Consortium Limited's (BECL) admini- 
stration of the project had to be completed within three months 
or a new company with new financing would be considered. In 
fact, a legal loophole favouring BECL was utilised to avoid this. 
In 1987-88, under the terms of the Second Stage Expressway 
concession bidding, EAT granted special rights to BECL as a 
'prior right' consortium, which allowed the company to be the 
first contractor to be considered for the construction of the road 
extension, provided that BECL's bid proved as competitive as 
that of any other company. Although the Attorney General 
eventually decided to liberalise the bidding procedure, the 
EAT-under PDP influence-ignored this directive and awarded 
the contract to BECL. A cabinet meeting on 30 October 1995 also 
decided to ignore the open bidding principle suggested by the 
Attorney General, and instead approved a proposal by a special 
Interior Ministry committee headed by PDP favouring BECL. 
BECL had three Shinawatra groups as corporate shareholders: 
Mrs Potjaman Shinawatra (wife of Thaksin) held 8 million of 
the shares, Thaksin himself 2 million shares, and SC Asset 
(owned by Thaksin) 29 million shares. This totalled 39 million 
shares worth 393 million baht of the total 100 million BECL 
shares which were valued at 1,000 million baht.9 On 22 January 
1996 a cabinet meeting quickly approved the BECL concession 
of the Daokanong-Bangkunthien-Samutsakorn Rapid Transit 
Project. 
Latest developments 
When the 'boom economy' suddenly turned into a 'bust econ- 
omy' in July 1997, the two previous competitors, CP and 
Shinawatra, became new allies. 
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Table 1 shows the net performance of the telecommunica- 
tions companies during the first nine months of 1997. We can 
see that almost all of them suffered substantial losses. Only two 
performed well, namely Advanced Info Service of Shinawatra 
group and Jusmin. 
Not only that, unhedged US dollar loans caused huge losses 
to the telecommunications companies after the Thai govern- 
ment decided to float the baht on 2 July 1997 (see Table 2). 
Shinawatra's three telecoms companies had altogether un- 
hedged loans amounting to US$680 million (Advanced 
US$70m, Satellite US$180m and Shinawatra US$430m), while 
Telecom Asia of CP had unhedged loans amounting to 
US$1,000 million. With the falling value of the baht against the 
dollar, the debt burden on these loans increased substantially. 
Table 1: 
Telecom Stock Performance 
(Net results, Jan.-Sept. 1997; 
billion baht) 
Sources: The Stock Exchange 
of Thai1and;The Nation, 18 
November 1997: B2. 
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Table 2: Foreign Currency Exposure 
Source: The Nation, 18 November 1997: B2 
Thus, the two previous competitors-UTV (CP) and IBC (Shina- 
watra)-made a surprise announcement on 15 June 1998 that 
they were to merge into one company: UBC. One of the official 
reasons given for this merger was that the two previous compe- 
titors could both benefit from their huge investments and share 
their respective telephone networks-CP's fibre-optic network 
and Shinawatrafs cellular telephone network-thus neither of 
them would need to make additional investment in transmis- 
sion technology, and they would also become co-owners of 
their respective telephone networks as well as sharing subscrib- 
ers. Another reason given for the merger by the CP Chairman 
Dhanin Chearavanont was that it had become necessary for 
conglomerates within the same industries to merge or form alli- 
ances in order to compete with multinational giants (Bangkok 
Post, 15 June 1998:l). The simple fact, though, is that the merger 
is an attempt to restore a monopolistic environment in the tele- 
communications sector. The next logical step will be the merger 
of their core telecommunications companies: TA of CP and AIS 
of Shinawatra. 
But Shinawatra and CP are not only merging capital and 
technologies, they are also pooling their political resources. On 
14 July 1998 Thaksin Shinawatra officially registered a new 
political party-Thai Rak Thai [TRT; 'Thai loves Thai']. TRT, 
while initiated by Thaksin, also has two top CP executives as 
Ukrist Pathmanand 
co-founders and members of the party's executive committee. 
One is Virachai Viramaitheekun, the youngest son-in-law of CP 
Chairman Dhanin Chearavanont. The other is the current 
Deputy Managing Director of CP, Dr Sarasin Viraphon, ex- 
Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
On the inauguration day of the party, Thaksin said that TRT 
was the first party to be created under the new constitution and 
that the party was determined to serve and work for Thai soci- 
ety (Bangkok Post, 15 July 1998: 3). 
One major reason for CP's alliance with Thaksin's new politi- 
cal party is that CP's close relationship with its traditional 
political ally, NAP under the leadership of Chavalit, has been 
severed. This happened when some of the CP top executives 
both privately and publicly voiced strong criticism of the 
Chavalit administration for its unsuccessful financial policies 
and for the way it had handled the economic crisis. Thus CP 
needs new political channels. One way is to stop using proxies 
and to build up their own political base instead. This is an 
attractive long-term strategy which explains the rationale 
behind CP's collaboration with Shinawatra's new party. But CP 
also needs an immediate political channel to the government, 
Thus CP has made a new political alliance with the Democrat 
Party now in power by sending Sarasin Viraphon to be Prime 
Minister Chuan's foreign affairs advisor. 
Conclusion 
What are the implications for Thai society of this merger of 
money and politics as well as of the monopolisation trend in the 
telecommunications sector? 
If these mergers prove to be successful in the long term, the 
resulting monopoly will leave Thai consumers with no alterna- 
tives. If, in addition, the merger of TA of CP and AIS of 
Shinawatra becomes a workable reality, they will jointly com- 
mand assets worth over 141 billion baht. Their market capitali- 
sation at 69 billion baht would be the third largest in the Thai 
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stock market, after PTT Exploration and Production and Bang- 
kok Bank (Bangkok Post, 15 June 1998: 1). This enormous con- 
centration of capital will be able to manipulate the entire tele- 
communications market. 
In the political arena one could fear the same monopolising 
trend. Before founding the TRT party, both Thaksin and CP 
were forced to give financial support to various political parties 
simultaneously. Now, both of them can concentrate their finan- 
cial and political resources in one political party. In other 
words, TRT will become the political party of a gigantic tele- 
communications capital group. If this political trend is 
cemented, we shall see a significant shift in the relationship 
between capital groups and politicians in Thai society. Until 
now, there has been a symbiotic relationship between politi- 
cians (royal family members, aristocrats, bureaucrats (civil and 
military) and members of parliament) and capital. The capital 
groups have distributed their wealth to politicians in many 
political parties as a quid pro quo for receiving monopolies, con- 
cessions, licences, quotas, construction projects, permits, etc. If 
the capital groups form their own political parties, their finan- 
cial largesse will not be distributed as widely as in the past. At 
the same time, political parties will function as the direct politi- 
cal arms of the big capitalists, even more than they do today. 
Thus there is the possibility that the whole party system-and 
indeed the whole parliamentary system-may become even 
more subverted by money than it already is. 
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Advanced Info Service Public Co. Ltd. 
Bangkok Expressway Consortium Ltd. 
Bangkok Mass Transit System 
Communications Authority of Thailand 
Charoen Phokapand 
Expressway Authority of Thailand 
International Broadcasting Corporation Ltd. 
International Engineering Public Co. Ltd. 
Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand 
Jusmin International Public Co. Ltd. 
New Aspiration Party; leader: Gen. Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh 
Palang ~ h a r m a  Party; founder: Maj. Gen. 
Chamlong Srimuang 
Petroleum Authority of Thailand 
Samart Corporation Public Co. Ltd. 
Shinawatra Satellite Public Co. Ltd. 
Stock Exchange of Thailand 
Shinawatra Computer and Communications 
Group Public Co. Ltd. 
Telecom Asia Corporation Public Co. Ltd. 
Total Access Communication Co. Ltd. 
Telephone Organization of Thailand 
Thai Rak Thai [Thai loves Thai]; political party 
founded 1998 by Thaltsin Shinawatra 
Thai Telephone & Communication Public Co. Ltd. 
UBC Cable TV 
United Communication Industry Public Co. Ltd. 
UTV Cable TV 
78 Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 13 * 98 
The Thaksin Shinawatra Group 
Notes 
I wish to thank the editor and the anonymous referee for many useful 
comments and suggestions. 
Bangkok Bank, Asia Trust Co., Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, Bank of 
Ayudhya, Union Bank of Bangkok. 
The IFCT was established in 1959, a) to establish, extend, and develop 
private industrial firms and b) to stimulate domestic and foreign bank loan 
syndication. 
In spite of being a governmental agency, 53% of IFCT was owned by 
Thai businessmen and commercial banks such as the Lamsam family (Thai 
Farmers' Bank), the Sophonpanit family (Bangkok Bank), the Shonwijarn 
family (Union Bank of Bangkok), and the Boonsung family (Laem Thong 
Bank) (Chamlong 1964: 47-51). 
Because of two abortive coups in 1981 and 1985 as well as withdrawal of 
support by various political parties, General Prem developed a strategy of 
balancing support from the bureaucrats (including military leaders) on the 
one hand and politicians on the other. This meant that the Prem government 
avoided controversial issues, such as telecommunications deregulation 
(Sakkarin Niyomsilpa 1995: 84). 
In July 1995, an MP of the New Aspiration Party, Kaew Buasuwan as 
head of the parliamentary Telecommunications Committee and Deputy 
Minister of the Ministry of Communication and Telecommunications 
ordered both Advanced Info Service of the Shinawatra group and Total 
Access Communication of the Ucom group to improve their services, if not, 
the ministry would allow new companies to bid. (Matichon Weekly, 15 March 
1996: 10-11). 
' The idea behind this project amounting to 26 billion baht was to 
modernise Thai military technology through satellite, pager and computer 
networks. American Delta would launch the satellite, while British 
Aerospace and Matra Marconi Space would construct it (The Nation, 3 
January 1996). 
In the past, the PDP had close connections with some business 
politicians, local government and big construction companies, but after 
Thaksin became party head, affiliations to finance firms have superseded 
these older relations. 
9 File on Bangkok Expressway SC Asset has a registered capital of 8 
billion baht and became a public company on 23 June 1994. This company 
also belongs to the Shinawatra group because Banpot Damapong, Thaksin's 
brother-in-law, is a major shareholder (20 million shares amounting to 200 
million baht). See: File on SC Asset. 
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